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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23 June 2009

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New York, 4-15 May 2009

Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2009, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku ..... (Zimbabwe)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Opening of the session

1. **The Chairman** declared open the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Statement by the Secretary-General

2. **The Secretary-General** said that, for too long, the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda had been stagnating in a cold war mentality. In 2005, the world had experienced what might be called a disarmament depression. The Review Conference that year had ended in disappointment, while the 2005 World Summit Outcome contained not a single line on weapons of mass destruction. Today, the world seemed to be emerging from that low point. However, the change seen in recent weeks was unfolding against a backdrop of multiple threats that, while themselves urgent, tended to obscure the urgency of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. The global economic crisis, climate change and the outbreak of the influenza A (H1N1) virus served as reminders of the interdependent nature of today's world and demanded a full and forceful multilateral response. At the same time, nuclear weapons remained an apocalyptic threat. The international community could not afford to place disarmament and non-proliferation on the back burner. States must not be lulled into complacency or miss the opportunity to make their societies safer and more prosperous.

3. As Secretary-General, he had been using every opportunity to push for progress. He had discussed non-proliferation and disarmament with Russian President Medvedev and United States President Obama and welcomed the joint commitment they had announced the previous month to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT. He was particularly encouraged that both countries were committed rapidly to pursuing verifiable reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals by replacing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) with a new, legally binding pact. He hoped their example would serve as a catalyst in inspiring other nuclear powers to follow suit.

4. He encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with a view to demonstrating the entirely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and to re-engage in negotiations with the so-called E3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus the United States, the Russian Federation and China) and the European Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and in line with the package of proposals for cooperation with the country.

5. With respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and despite the current serious challenges, he continued to believe that the six-party process was the best mechanism for achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. He therefore urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the talks so that respective concerns could be resolved through dialogue and cooperation, on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and multilateral and bilateral agreements.

6. Furthermore, he urged all States to end the stalemate that had marked the international disarmament machinery for so long. To strengthen the NPT regime, it was essential for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force without further delay and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a verifiable fissile material treaty. He commended the commitment of the United States to ratifying the CTBT and urged all countries that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty without conditions.

7. Hopes for a breakthrough on the deadlocked disarmament agenda had been building. There had been a cascade of proposals. Elder statesmen, leaders of nuclear-weapon States, regional groups, various commissions and civil society representatives had elaborated proposals for slaying the nuclear monster. Their voices, though varied, belonged to a rising chorus demanding action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Concerns about nuclear terrorism, a new rush by some to possess nuclear arms and renewed interest in nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels had only heightened the need for urgent action.

8. The Committee's work over the next two weeks would be critical. Delegations must seize the moment

and show their seriousness. The current session must be used to generate agreement on key procedural issues and substantive recommendations to the Review Conference, which in turn must produce a clear commitment by all States parties to comply fully with all their obligations under the NPT. He urged delegations to adopt a spirit of compromise and flexibility and, rather than taking absolute positions that had no chance of generating consensus, to build bridges and to be part of a new multilateralism.

9. People knew intuitively that nuclear weapons would never make the world more secure and that real security lay in responding to poverty, climate change, armed conflict and instability. People wanted Governments to invest in plans for growth and development, not in weapons of mass destruction. If the Committee could pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free world, it would send a desperately needed message of hope. He wished States parties every success, both at the current session and at the Review Conference.

Statement by the Chairman

10. **The Chairman** said that the current session came at an opportune time in the history of the NPT. There was abundant political will among States parties for the Review Conference to succeed. The Committee must not miss the current window of opportunity. It must focus on the core business of the NPT so as to prepare for a successful Review Conference that resulted in a stronger and more effective Treaty. As Chairman, he would do his utmost to guide the session towards a successful outcome. To do so, however, he would require the cooperation, advice and assistance of States parties. In that connection, he reminded delegations that the Committee must provide an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference to prevent a repeat of the 2005 Review Conference.

Organization of work

11. **The Chairman** recalled that the agenda for all Preparatory Committee sessions had been adopted at the first session in 2007 and issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15. It was also reproduced in the Committee's report on its second session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/13, para. 7).

12. He drew attention to the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.3), which should be read in conjunction with the programme of work (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.2). He took it that the Committee wished to take note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.3).

13. *It was so decided.*

14. **The Chairman** recalled that, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference, which were applied mutatis mutandis to the work of the Committee, representatives of the United Nations and of IAEA were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee and to submit material, both orally and in writing. He further recalled that, at its first session, the Committee had adopted the following decision, based on previous decisions and the relevant rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference:

> "Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.
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> "Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis.
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> "Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee

other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee."

15. In that regard, he said that requests to attend the meetings of the Committee had been received from Palestine; from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the League of Arab States, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); and from 77 NGOs (listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.4). He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

16. *It was so decided.*

17. **The Chairman** drew attention to the financial report contained in NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/1, which had been submitted pursuant to a decision of the Committee at its second session. At that session, the Committee had also agreed that assessed and outstanding dues must be paid in proper time. As the report indicated, a significant amount of outstanding dues remained, some dating back to 1995. He was pleased to report that there were adequate funds for the holding of the current session. The agility shown by many States parties in recent months in paying their outstanding dues on time should ensure that the requisite funds for the Review Conference were deposited with the Secretariat well in advance and that the necessary arrangements could therefore be made. Payments made by States parties subsequent to the processing and printing of the financial report would be reflected in an addendum to the report, to be finalized by the Secretariat towards the end of the current session.

18. He also drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.1, in particular paragraphs 8 and 9 on documentation. The Committee must conform to the guidelines for the submission of documentation mandated by the General Assembly to ensure timely translation and distribution of documents. To expedite the processing and issuance of in-session documents, it was strongly recommended that documents should not exceed five pages. To comply with those requirements, delegations were encouraged to provide only new information when submitting reports. Working papers and proposals already submitted in the review cycle need not be resubmitted. At the Committee's first session in 2007, there had been an almost threefold increase in documentation compared to the first session in the previous review cycle. At its second session in 2008, the number of documents had fallen by over half. The production of official documentation in six languages was one of the most expensive budget items and a major factor in escalating costs.

19. Lastly, the representative of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and of the League of Arab States had asked to make a statement during the Committee's general debate. He took it that, in accordance with the decision taken at its first session, the Committee wished to invite them to make a statement at the end of the general debate.

20. *It was so decided.*

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

21. **Mr. Moreno Fernández** (Cuba), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that an opportunity to make progress on the Treaty's disarmament pillar was within sight. He welcomed the recent commitment by the United States and the Russian Federation to work towards implementation of article VI of the NPT. Now, nuclear-weapon States must take concrete steps to eliminate nuclear weapons in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner. Every effort must be made to create an environment conducive to strengthening the NPT regime and providing humankind with the security it needed. Procedural issues must be resolved during the current session. States parties should focus not on their differences, but on reaching common objectives.

22. Despite some promising signs, nuclear disarmament remained a long way off. The non-aligned States parties remained convinced of their long-standing positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and committed to meeting their obligations under both the NPT and the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The only way to guarantee that no party would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons was to eliminate them. Full

implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 remained crucial The Review Conference should call for the establishment of a specific time frame for article VI implementation and of a mechanism for verifying nuclear-weapon State compliance. To that end, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament should be established within Main Committee I.

23. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, non-nuclear-weapon States should be granted universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body on such assurances.

24. For the objective of the NPT to be met, its three pillars must be implemented in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. The NPT sought to ensure a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. The indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

25. He welcomed efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions. States must cooperate and consult with a view to concluding agreements in that regard. The establishment of such zones and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status constituted a positive and important step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

26. Noting that nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the NPT continued to develop and to modernize their nuclear arsenals at the expense of international peace and security, particularly in the Middle East, he called for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He also called for the establishment within Main Committee II of a subsidiary body responsible for considering, and making proposals on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and of the 2000 Review Conference outcome, which reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and of the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

27. He reiterated the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology should be assured. According to the 2000 Review Conference outcome, each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected. Article VI was very explicit in that regard, leaving room for neither interpretation of the Treaty nor the establishment of conditions. The damage caused by the excessive restrictions applied to developing country States parties should be remedied.

28. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from sharing nuclear know-how for military purposes. Moreover, the transfer of nuclear equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices and the provision of nuclear, scientific and technological assistance to States not parties to the Treaty should be prohibited. The nuclear cooperation agreement recently concluded with a State not party to the Treaty was a matter of great concern since it would allow nuclear material to be transferred to non-safeguarded facilities, in violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995.

29. Article X of the Treaty was very clear regarding the right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty. The Non-Aligned States parties' position had not changed: proposals in that regard went beyond the Treaty's provisions and the right of States parties to withdraw from treaties or conventions should be governed by international treaty law.

30. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference had been extremely disappointing. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the Committee should seek to achieve early consensus on outstanding procedural issues.

31. As the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the NPT protected the world from nuclear war. States must work tirelessly to make the regime universal, attach equal importance to the Treaty's three pillars, and work together to ensure that the three nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, without preconditions. He called on delegations to work towards strengthening the NPT regime with a view to eliminating nuclear weapons. For the current window of opportunity to be fully realized, all States parties must do their part. The non-aligned States parties would work constructively and actively to ensure that the current session achieved concrete outcomes.

32. **Mr. Pojar** (Czech Republic), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the NPT provided a unique framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security and stability. The current challenges in the field of international security made the NPT more important than ever. The international community had a duty to maintain and strengthen its authority and integrity and to continue to advocate its universality. To that end, the European Union would continue to promote all the objectives contained therein.

33. He welcomed the renewed engagement of the United States and the Russian Federation, and the renewed commitment by the international community to the entry into force of the CTBT and to beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He also noted with interest the renewed international debate on ways to advance the Treaty's objectives. The year 2009 presented serious proliferation challenges and would be decisive in finding negotiated solutions, particularly for the Iranian nuclear issue.

34. The current review cycle presented an opportunity to foster a sense of common purpose among States parties and to create a more secure international environment. The European Union would continue to work to make it a success. Expressing support for the resolution and decisions adopted in 1995, the final document adopted in 2000 and the universality of the NPT, he called on States not parties to the NPT to join it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. At the current session, the European Union would work with all States parties to agree on the provisional agenda and rules of procedure of the Review Conference and the nomination of its president; to identify areas of convergence under each pillar; and to achieve consensus on recommendations to the Review Conference.

36. To be successful, the Review Conference must attach equal importance to all three pillars and adopt concrete, effective, pragmatic and consensual measures in that regard. To that end, the European Union had elaborated proposals on each pillar for inclusion in an action plan to be adopted by the Review Conference.

37. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime was a key priority. The European Union would continue to promote the universalization and implementation of rules and instruments preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. NPT States parties must strictly comply with their obligations in that regard and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance by others. The proliferation risks presented by the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a matter of serious concern. A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was cardinal, since the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a military nuclear capability would constitute an unacceptable threat to regional and international security. The universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system was also important. To be effective, international action against proliferation must be based on operational cooperation. To that end, in 2008 the European Union had adopted new lines for action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

38. The European Union was committed to nuclear disarmament. It welcomed the reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the cold war; the commitment by the United States and by the Russian Federation to replace the START I Treaty with a new, legally binding treaty before it expired in December 2009; and the nuclear disarmament measures adopted by its two nuclear-weapon member States. The international community should promote the disarmament initiatives by the European Union to the General Assembly in 2008. In the short term, it was particularly important to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT and to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

39. The European Union supported the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It also supported the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation and assistance and was the prime contributor to its technical cooperation fund.

40. The development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses must take place in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. The European Union was committed to strengthened international cooperation in that regard. It supported IAEA in helping States develop the necessary infrastructure, and had set up an

instrument for nuclear safety cooperation to help countries benefit from its significant experience in that regard.

41. The establishment of multilateral mechanisms offered a credible alternative to the development of national capabilities for sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The European Union stood ready to contribute up to €25 million to the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA control and looked forward to discussing other similar proposals.

42. The European Union fully supported the work of IAEA as a unique organization for promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation, ensuring nuclear safety, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and countering nuclear terrorism.

43. Lastly, the European Union remained committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the IAEA General Conference, and called on the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

44. **Mr. Ahlström** (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the Coalition remained fully committed to the objectives and to all three pillars of the NPT. The long-term success of the Treaty depended on full implementation of all its aspects. At the current session, the Committee must finalize the procedural arrangements for, and agree on substantive input and recommendations to, the Review Conference. At the very least, it must agree on a framework for approaching the Review Conference. The mistakes that had caused the 2005 Review Conference to fail must not be repeated.

45. He welcomed the progress made on nuclear disarmament, but noted with concern that most of the weapons reductions made thus far were not irreversible, transparent or verifiable; that the role of nuclear weapons in security policies had not been diminished; that the CTBT had still not entered into force; and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had still not begun. In addition, no real progress had been made towards creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. The Review Conference should adopt practical measures leading to implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

46. That said, he welcomed the increased support for the resolution on nuclear disarmament that the coalition had submitted to the General Assembly at its current session; the recent joint statement by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; the commitment by the new United States administration to ratify the CTBT; and the gradual rebuilding of the consensus on launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He looked forward to concrete and transparent progress on those and other issues before the Review Conference, which would provide an opportunity not only to review the operation of all aspects of the Treaty, but also to forge a renewed commitment to realizing its objectives.

47. The Coalition had submitted a working paper on nuclear disarmament at each of the Preparatory Committee's two previous sessions. The first identified seven areas requiring urgent attention. The second focused on transparency, confidence-building and operational readiness. At the current session, the Coalition would submit a further working paper containing additional reflections and recommendations. All three papers remained current and could be used to build consensus on recommendations to the Review Conference.

48. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) welcomed recent efforts to move nuclear disarmament forward, in particular the statement of President Medvedev delivered to the Conference on Disarmament in March and the joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April. In that regard, he stressed that the parties to the START I Treaty undertook not to base arms outside their national territories. President Medvedev had clearly defined the conditions for nuclear disarmament: the militarization of outer space must be prevented; nuclear reductions must not be compensated for by developing strategic systems equipped with conventional weapons; and the impossibility of creating recoverable nuclear capabilities must be ensured. A situation in which nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the NPT disarmed while those not bound by the Treaty increased their nuclear-weapon capability was unacceptable.

49. His delegation supported the early launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The moratorium on nuclear testing, while important, was not a substitute for the CTBT. Annex 2 States that had not yet done so should sign and ratify the CTBT as

early as possible. He welcomed the commitment by the United States in that regard.

50. Much progress had been made in preventing non-State actors from accessing nuclear weapons and materials. His delegation welcomed the recent establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and stood ready to discuss the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East with all interested parties with a view to developing recommendations for adoption by the Review Conference.

51. One way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was to make IAEA verification activities more efficient. The additional protocol provided opportunities in that regard and, along with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, should become the universally accepted standard for verifying States' compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations and an essential new standard in the area of nuclear exports.

52. Lastly, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle were becoming increasingly important. The Russian President had proposed developing a global nuclear energy infrastructure, while the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan had established the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk.

53. **Mr. Cheng** Jingye (China) said that the international community must seize the opportunity presented by the Review Conference to promote, in a comprehensive and balanced way, the Treaty's three main objectives. As a nuclear-weapon State, China had worked tirelessly for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It had exercised restraint in developing nuclear weapons; had never deployed a nuclear weapon in another country; and had never participated in a nuclear arms race. It had been among the first States to sign the CTBT and had adhered strictly to the moratorium on nuclear testing. It also supported an early start to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

54. Nuclear disarmament should be a fair and reasonable process of gradual reductions. Measures taken in that regard should promote international strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Nuclear-weapon States should commit to the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and should conclude an international legal instrument to that end. In the meantime, they should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies and those States should assume a self-defensive approach to nuclear-weapon use. The United States and the Russian Federation bore particular responsibility and should continue drastically to cut their nuclear arsenals. He welcomed their agreement to begin negotiating a new bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty and hoped they would further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

55. Noting that nuclear disarmament was closely linked to international strategic stability, he said that the Conference on Disarmament should conclude an international legal instrument prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. With regard to anti-ballistic missile systems, the countries concerned should consider the security interests of others and refrain from taking actions that might undermine international nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and supported the early establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

56. The international community should adopt a holistic approach to nuclear proliferation. An effort should be made to build an international environment of cooperation and trust. Regional nuclear issues should be addressed through dialogue and negotiation, the universality and integrity of the international non-proliferation regime further strengthened, and the practice of selectivity discarded. His Government was in favour of strengthening the IAEA safeguards function and of promoting the universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The six-party talks remained an important mechanism for addressing the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. The parties concerned should exercise restraint and work together to maintain the process and to safeguard peace and stability in the peninsula. China also supported a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations. The parties concerned should seize the current opportunity and step up their diplomatic efforts and relaunch negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3.

57. The relationship between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation should be handled in a balanced manner to ensure that they mutually reinforced rather than conflicted with each other. His Government supported recent initiatives to establish a multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanism. The international community should work together to find a practical solution acceptable to all. China also supported IAEA efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

58. **Ms. Swords** (Canada) said that achieving a realistic and balanced agenda for the Review Conference should be a priority, with the 2000 Review Conference's agenda possibly serving as a starting point.

59. The challenge posed by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had yet to be adequately addressed. Her delegation welcomed the progress made by the six-party talks, but was discouraged by that country's recent missile launch. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must comply with Security Council resolutions, meet its commitments under the six-party talks and recommit to the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran, meanwhile, should comply with Security Council resolutions and work proactively with IAEA. As for allegations that the Syrian Arab Republic had clandestinely constructed a nuclear reactor, she stressed that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes came with obligations.

60. She welcomed the nuclear weapons reductions of recent years. The renewed momentum of disarmament talks between the Russian Federation and the United States was particularly encouraging. She hoped they would be able to meet the goal set out in their recent joint statement. That said, disarmament negotiations were the responsibility of all States. She also noted with regret that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet begun, that the CTBT had not yet entered into force and that the disarmament commitments made in 1995 remained unfulfilled. All States were urged to take steps to advance those three initiatives.

61. Canada believed that nuclear energy was critical in increasing prosperity, promoting sustainable development, limiting greenhouse gas emissions and reducing disparities between developed and developing countries and had therefore supported peaceful nuclear cooperation with India.

62. The international community was entering a promising new era. It should think seriously about how to improve the effectiveness of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation. Some of the recent challenges to the NPT could be addressed by bolstering the review process through permanent political and administrative support. Her delegation found it disquieting that the NPT lacked the permanent institutional support enjoyed by even modest multilateral conventions and had therefore submitted a working paper advancing recommendations designed to strengthen its structure and meeting schedule.

63. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons both within and outside the framework of the NPT called into question its viability as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. The Committee's recommendations to the Review Conference must stress the importance of implementing the Treaty in a balanced manner and of taking practical steps to meet the obligations contained in the Treaty and in previous review conference outcomes. That, in turn, required the speedy achievement of NPT universality, particularly in the Middle East, where States were subjected to a growing nuclear threat.

64. Only through NPT universality and fulfilment of NPT obligations by nuclear-weapon States could the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons be attained. Recent declarations by some nuclear-weapon States of their renewed commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, while welcome, did not in and of themselves suffice to protect the Treaty. The continued possession by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear arsenals for deterrence purposes, the development of new generations of such weapons, the provision of assistance to States not parties to the Treaty and the continued deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States undermined the Treaty's objectives and the presumed equality among non-nuclear-weapon States.

65. The Committee must recognize that nuclear disarmament had not been achieved. Recent statements on nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by time-bound measures based on the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. Efforts to revive the Conference on Disarmament would hopefully lead to agreement on a

balanced and comprehensive programme of work that included negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. During the present review cycle, States parties must also conclude global, non-discriminatory, legally binding arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

66. Despite the efforts of Middle Eastern States to adhere to the NPT and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel's rejection of any commitments and its continued involvement in non-peaceful nuclear activities outside the scope of the NPT subjected the region to the threat of a nuclear arms race. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East had been central to Arab States' acceptance of the Treaty's indefinite extension. In the absence of any practical steps towards its implementation, Arab peoples questioned the utility of extending a treaty that had neither guaranteed their security nor led to Israel acceding to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State or placing its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That some nuclear-weapon States had lent support to States not parties to the Treaty only compounded fears that such preferential treatment might be extended to Israel in the future. The sponsors of the Resolution were responsible for its full implementation.

67. The Arab commitment to regional peace and security had been at the core of the Arab Peace Initiative. Israel's rejection of that proposal and of the two-State solution and its refusal to accede to the NPT or to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards were the main obstacles to regional peace and security. While Israel unjustifiably pointed to Arab threats, the Arab States had legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis Israel's nuclear programme. Efforts to address regional non-proliferation issues were intrinsically linked to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East and to the achievement of equality in the rights and responsibilities of all States in the region.

68. Egypt recognized the right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear-weapon States parties must facilitate access by such States to nuclear technology and materials. He noted with concern the attempts by some to restrict the ability of non-nuclear-weapon States to exercise that right by creating artificial categories of sensitive and non-sensitive nuclear technologies and of responsible and irresponsible States, and attempts by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to impose additional restrictions on some but not all countries, to influence the determination of States' nuclear energy requirements and to restrict their fuel supply choices.

69. The NPT was clearly in need of a comprehensive review. His Government attached great importance to the adoption, by consensus, of a comprehensive review outcome that reaffirmed the commitment of all States parties and presented a time-bound plan of action for implementing the Treaty and the 1995 extension package.

70. **Mr. Sullivan** (Australia) welcomed the renewed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and the disarmament measures recently announced by President Obama and the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. Now non-nuclear-weapon States must commit not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place their nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Moreover, the Committee should adopt an agenda and identify key issues for consideration in 2010.

71. Australia had long supported nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2008, the Prime Minister had announced the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which aimed to reinvigorate global efforts in that regard. He welcomed the decision by the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude a legally binding and verifiable successor to the START I Treaty, and the nuclear reductions made by France and the United Kingdom. China was encouraged to make reductions in a similarly transparent manner. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to commit to faster, deeper and irreversible reductions in all categories of nuclear weapon. To that end, all States should give priority to the entry into force of the CTBT. As one of the Conference on Disarmament Presidents for 2009, Australia was working hard to ensure that during the current year the Conference agreed to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the context of agreement on a balanced programme of work.

72. The unwillingness of some States to cooperate fully with IAEA raised concerns about the nature of their nuclear programmes. Prevention of nuclear terrorism was an important part of the agenda to

prevent nuclear proliferation. While its guarantee of access to peaceful nuclear energy was central to the strength of the NPT, the right to peaceful energy was not unqualified, but must be exercised in accordance with its provisions. His delegation was interested in hearing more about multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle that might help prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. He called on India, Pakistan and Israel to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Non-proliferation disciplines should be extended to those States to the maximum extent possible.

73. The Review Conference could usefully issue a blueprint for action, possibly along the lines of the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. For States parties to have confidence in such a blueprint, they would need assurances that all States were implementing past Review Conference outcomes and that States parties would be able to monitor implementation of the NPT more effectively than they had in the past. To that end, the proposal to replace the Preparatory Committee process by shorter annual meetings of States parties was worth exploring. Lastly, the Review Conference outcome should assist progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and take into account the legitimate security concerns of all States in the region.

74. **Ms. Mosley** (New Zealand) said that the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation landscape seemed to be on the cusp of positive change. She welcomed the recent comments by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and their commitment to negotiate a new nuclear reductions agreement. The road map to a nuclear-free world recently announced by Japan contained much that resonated with New Zealand. Her delegation looked forward to the conference that Japan planned to host in early 2010.

75. New Zealand was pleased to contribute to non-proliferation efforts. It was a member of the IAEA Board of Governors and of the Proliferation Security Initiative and had implemented robust export controls. Complex verification issues must be addressed firmly by upholding the Treaty's integrity and by reinforcing the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. The IAEA Additional Protocol was key and, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, formed the contemporary verification standard.

76. Her delegation remained concerned about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The Islamic Republic of Iran should cooperate fully with IAEA and comply without delay with all IAEA Board of Governor decisions and with Security Council resolutions. The nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea posed a serious challenge to nuclear non-proliferation and to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and beyond. That the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had responded to international condemnation of its recent missile launch by expelling IAEA inspectors was disappointing. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should rethink its decision and re-engage in the six-party talks.

77. It was important to ensure that peaceful uses of nuclear technology remained accessible to all States parties and that such technologies were managed safely and securely and did not contribute to nuclear proliferation. Waste management was a key consideration too. Her delegation stood ready to work with all States parties to ensure that the Review Conference comprehensively reviewed the NPT and agreed on a course of action that would strengthen the NPT and bring the world one step closer to being free of nuclear weapons.

78. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that, though the NPT was facing extraordinary challenges, international circumstances offered an opportunity to move the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward. The current session should be used to revive the spirit of cooperation evident in 2000. To that end, he hoped that procedural issues could be resolved quickly so that attention could turn to matters of substance.

79. Kyrgyzstan's high expectations following the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences remained only partially realized. His Government was particularly disappointed by the continued stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament, the failure to bring the CTBT into force, the lack of visible progress on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty and the halt to reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. He hoped that the current cycle would address implementation of the 13 practical steps and discuss ways to accelerate transparent and irreversible reductions in all categories of nuclear weapon. His delegation attached particular importance to the expeditious entry into force of the CTBT, which Kyrgyzstan had ratified in 2003.

80. He was pleased to report the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the parties to which undertook, inter alia, to assist in the environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated as a result of past nuclear weapons activities and to conclude with IAEA an additional protocol.

81. The world had changed significantly in recent years. The nuclear non-proliferation regime must adapt. International safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. As such, his delegation supported IAEA efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system; efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

82. Inadequate attention had been paid in the past to mitigating the environmental impact of nuclear weapons programmes. He called on all Governments and international organizations with expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider providing assistance for remedial purposes and drew attention to the regional conference on the uranium tailings held in Bishkek in April 2009 and to the high-level international forum on uranium tailings to be held in Geneva in June.

83. Lastly, he welcomed the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124) and endorsed the opinion expressed in General Assembly resolution 57/60. His delegation appreciated the leadership shown by Japan, among others, in raising the issue of education and training in the NPT context and looked forward to working with other interested Member States in developing practical steps to assist the implementation of the measures called for by the study.

84. **Mr. Benmehidi** (Algeria) said that recent statements by the leaders of nuclear-weapon States — in particular the United States and the Russian Federation — augured well for the implementation of international disarmament commitments, with a new approach that would impact positively on efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

85. The current session was essential to the preparation and therefore to the success of the Review Conference. The Committee must make not only procedural recommendations but also substantive recommendations on all three pillars. To that end, he proposed reviewing the implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995. States parties had a responsibility to send out a strong signal concerning the validity of the multilateral framework and to lend credibility to the NPT. The balanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars was essential in that regard.

86. He called on nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI, including by implementing the 13 practical steps. Transparency, verifiability and irreversibility were essential in that regard. They must also undertake to reduce the role of, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons. He hoped that recent comments to that effect would translate into concrete action. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, non-nuclear-weapon States must be given security assurances. Given the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the lack of progress towards the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East was lamentable. Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards meant that the region was in a state of permanent insecurity.

87. The CTBT was a key element of nuclear disarmament. Those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified it should do so without delay. His delegation was encouraged by the international community's renewed commitment to beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and by the readiness of the United States to commit to a verifiable treaty.

88. On non-proliferation, he called for the non-selective, balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the relevant provisions of the NPT. He also reiterated the inalienable right of all parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Current discussions on the establishment of a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle mechanism, meanwhile, should enjoy the broadest consultation possible among Member States.

89. Lastly, in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria had submitted a comprehensive and balanced draft programme of work for that body which it hoped would enjoy the support of all Member States and thereby enable the Conference to resume its work.

90. **Mr. Oh** Joon (Republic of Korea) said that the disarmament debate had been reinvigorated by such initiatives as the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament and President Obama's vision for a nuclear-weapon-free world. The commitment by the United States and the Russian Federation to replace the START I Treaty by the end of the year was also encouraging. That said, the NPT faced grave challenges, particularly with regard to non-proliferation. It was regrettable that, despite strenuous efforts to denuclearize it, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had recently launched a missile and threatened further measures including nuclear tests and test-firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles. He urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its NPT obligations and with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and subsequent agreements adopted at the six-party talks.

91. To strengthen the NPT regime, the nuclear safeguards regime should be strengthened through universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Disarmament and non-proliferation required the early entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He welcomed the commitment by the United States to ratify the CTBT and urged countries that had not yet done so to follow suit.

92. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was key to achieving sustainable socio-economic development but required effective safeguards against misuse.

93. His delegation recognized the merit of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. States in need of peaceful nuclear energy might be discouraged from pursuing their own uranium enrichment technology if an international mechanism provided a guaranteed and sustainable supply of fuel. Such an approach should be based on objective and fair criteria and implemented in such a way that did not deny or limit the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Lastly, States parties should consider an effective and collective response to withdrawal by a State party from the NPT.

94. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland) said that irreconcilable positions concerning the status of implementation of the NPT continued to prevent States parties from reaching agreement on how best to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Some concentrated on the risks of proliferation; others wanted more rapid disarmament; and a growing number did not accept that access to nuclear technology should be restricted by proliferation concerns.

95. Each concern was directly linked to one of the three pillars. The very sources of disagreement might, therefore, contain the makings of a compromise. The philosophy of compromise and the culture of multilateralism must be restored to their rightful place. States parties must commit to adjusting the emphasis placed on each of the three pillars, and implement, as soon as possible, the outcomes of previous review conferences, in particular the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 and the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000.

96. That said, there were grounds for optimism. He welcomed, in particular, the commitment by the presidents of the United States and of the Russian Federation to begin negotiations on a successor agreement to the START I Treaty and the prospects emerging at the multilateral level at the Conference on Disarmament.

97. He hoped that the current session provided an opportunity to confirm those developments and to give fresh impetus to the implementation of the NPT and to the multilateral machinery as a whole. He encouraged all States parties to work constructively to find a rapid solution to the procedural issues surrounding the Review Conference.

98. **Mr. Obisakin** (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, which aligned itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that the Group of African States remained committed to the three pillars of the NPT. He welcomed recent developments on nuclear disarmament. However, to be meaningful, disarmament must be transparent, verifiable and irreversible. A sound consensual basis for achieving that goal existed within the NPT context. It was important not to lose sight of past gains, including the implementation of the 13 practical steps of 2000.

99. Another shared goal was nuclear non-proliferation. African countries had played their part by adhering to the NPT and by concluding the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). The establishment of such zones was a positive steps towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their commitment to such zones and called for meaningful progress on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to give security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such assurances should be finalized in a universal and legally binding instrument as a matter of priority.

100. Lastly, multilateral forums provided the most effective framework for disarmament negotiations. He called on all delegations to demonstrate the political will needed to enhance progress on all three pillars of the NPT.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/SR.2

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

18 June 2009

Original: English

Summary record of the 2nd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2009, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku ..... (Zimbabwe)

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General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that it had been ten years since there had been political consensus, and very little progress in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been made in that time. The first pillar of the Treaty, non-proliferation, was a negative undertaking and had been largely successful, having been reinforced with additional measures, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Much less had been done with regard to the second pillar, a positive undertaking to establish a world free of nuclear weapons. The concept of a "credible deterrent" was still being discussed, even though it could give the impression that those weapons were useful. Cynicism about the impossibility of disinventing nuclear weapons ignored the fact that the international community had disinvented other weapons of mass destruction. Promises to disarm were generally accompanied by new proposals to tighten access to nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system remained of the utmost importance, and verification should be an integral part of every instrument concerning weapons of mass destruction.

2. When Brazil had become a party to the NPT, it had already renounced nuclear weapons at the highest level — in its Constitution — and comprehensive safeguards had already been accepted. Brazil was fully committed to the Treaty and ready to engage actively to preserve its integrity and promote its implementation.

3. **Mr. Al-Jarman** (United Arab Emirates), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that that the Group attached particular importance to the current session of the Preparatory Committee, which provided a welcome opportunity to overcome past differences and to build consensus in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference. For all its successes, the NPT had not yet become universal owing to the application of double standards in its implementation by some States. Such practices had not only undermined efforts aimed at the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones but had also diminished the credibility of the Treaty and its ability to safeguard the security of States parties in the Middle East.

4. The Arab Group therefore welcomed the positive initiatives launched recently by the President of the United States of America to work towards the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons; to engage in serious negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation for further reductions in strategic arms; to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); and to begin negotiations on a viable fissile material cut-off treaty.

5. Ultimately, the only guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used was their total elimination. In the meantime, however, the current session should focus on: maintaining a balance between the three pillars supporting the NPT; developing an international legally binding instrument to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; adopting a comprehensive action plan to ensure the universality of the Treaty; reaffirming the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, subject to verification by IAEA, reinvigorating the Conference on Disarmament; and adopting practical steps to ensure the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

6. **Ms. Kelly** (Ireland) said that the only feasible way to eliminate the continuing threat posed by nuclear weapons was their elimination. Her country had consistently called for the prioritization of nuclear disarmament and believed that the 13 practical steps agreed to that end in 2000 remained the benchmarks for future progress.

7. Her Government welcomed the recent initiative of the President of the United States of America to work towards a world without nuclear weapons, particularly his intention to strengthen the NPT, to pursue ratification of the CTBT and to seek a new treaty to verifiably end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. It also encouraged the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation to negotiate a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as a matter of urgency.

8. A number of immediate steps could be taken to strengthen the NPT, including increased transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The entry into

force of the CTBT would also make a significant contribution to the disarmament regime. In that context, Ireland reiterated its call for the States listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT to ratify the Treaty immediately and unconditionally.

9. For the past 40 years, the NPT had provided the essential framework for the development of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. The Treaty also contained key rights and obligations regarding the use of nuclear energy, which must be respected equally by all of its States parties. In view of the continued importance of the universality of the Treaty, Ireland continued to call on those States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT.

10. While it was important not to become sidetracked by procedures, it was equally critical to identify areas where the NPT strengthened review process could be improved. In that connection, a practical and progressive approach in line with the review process laid down by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was needed. Shorter annual meetings with the authority to adopt consensus decisions on issues requiring immediate attention should also be considered.

11. **Mr. Shibayama** (Japan) said that the current momentum towards nuclear disarmament should be fully capitalized upon to ensure the success of the 2010 Review Conference. Japan itself had consistently played a leading role in efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly by submitting an annual draft resolution on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which received the overwhelming support of the General Assembly, and its efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT.

12. The international community should continue to work towards the universalization of the NPT and, where appropriate, must work together to prevent States parties from abusing their legitimate rights under the Treaty. In that connection, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should take concrete actions to implement Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and the agreements reached at the Six-Party Talks. The Islamic Republic of Iran should also take appropriate steps to restore the confidence of the international community concerning the nature of its nuclear programme.

13. The Foreign Minister of Japan had recently outlined 11 key benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament, which could potentially become a foundation for consensus-building at the 2010 Review Conference. The benchmarks covered three basic areas: steps by all nuclear-weapon States; steps by the entire international community; and steps to support States promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those benchmarks had been included in a working paper submitted by Japan to the Secretariat. His Government also intended to hold an international meeting on global nuclear disarmament prior to the 2010 Review Conference.

14. **Mr. Cservény** (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that there was a wide expectation in the international community that States parties to the NPT would come together with a renewed unity of purpose to prepare the groundwork for a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. Since the 2005 Review Conference, 25 States parties had signed Additional Protocols and 24 States parties had brought Additional Protocols into force. Thus, a total of 120 States parties had Additional Protocols signed but not yet in force, and 91 States parties had Additional Protocols in force. Moreover, nearly three quarters of States with comprehensive safeguards agreements had signed Additional Protocols, and more than half of the States with such agreements now had Additional Protocols in force. In order to continue that steady progress, he called on those States that had not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols and safeguards agreements and to bring them into force without delay.

15. The 2008 safeguards implementation report had been submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors for its consideration in June 2009. To date, the Agency had concluded that all nuclear material had remained in peaceful activities for 51 of the 84 States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols in force. The same conclusion on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material had been drawn for the 70 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no Additional Protocols.

16. As of May 2009, the Agency had continued to apply safeguards under the comprehensive safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to verify the correctness and completeness of its declaration. While all declared nuclear material in that country remained in peaceful nuclear activities, a number of outstanding issues still needed to be clarified regarding its past nuclear activities.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic had denied allegations that its installation at the Dair Alzour site, destroyed by an Israeli air strike, had been the site of a nuclear reactor under construction. While all declared nuclear material in the Syrian Arab Republic remained in peaceful activities, the Agency was continuing its verification work in that country, including its investigation regarding the nature of the destroyed facility.

18. The Agency had been unable to reach any conclusions with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which did not have a safeguards agreement in place and where IAEA inspectors had been unable to perform any monitoring or verification activities since 14 April 2009.

19. States relying on nuclear power needed to have confidence in their ability to obtain nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost-effective manner over the long term. A dozen or so proposals on nuclear fuel supply assurances had already been made, including a notable proposal from the Russian Federation for a low-enriched uranium reserve for use by IAEA member States.

20. IAEA continued to play a key role as a catalyst for sustainable development and was an increasingly important part of both the global nuclear safety and security regime and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 2008, a total of $96.4 million had been disbursed to 122 countries and territories under the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, which was used to address the development priorities of its member States. In the area of nuclear safety and security, the Agency continued to support and promote the global nuclear safety and security regime as a framework for achieving high levels of safety and security in nuclear activities.

21. **Mr. Macedo** (Mexico) said that the time was right for progress towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in light of the recent statements made by leaders of nuclear-weapon States, the negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace the START I Treaty, and the statement made by the President of the United States of America in Prague expressing renewed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. The NPT was a fundamental instrument and achieving its universal ratification was a priority. States that were not party to the Treaty should sign it as soon as possible.

22. The total eradication of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee that they would never be used and would not proliferate. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the 13 practical steps contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)). Nuclear-weapon States should comply with their article VI obligations and accelerate the implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. States parties should strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including by introducing a moratorium on military nuclear activities, negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty, furthering the negotiations on a legally binding instrument on nuclear disarmament, and concluding a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

23. Universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was crucial. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion should be maintained pending entry into force of that Treaty. All States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and it was the role of IAEA to ensure that nuclear energy was being used exclusively for those purposes.

24. Mexico welcomed the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Establishing that zone raised the profile of countries that had renounced nuclear weapons and gave a stronger message of humanity's desire for a world without nuclear weapons. More States should conclude agreements to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they did not yet exist. To contribute to the success of the 2010 NPT review cycle, a second session of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones should be held, as had been agreed at the first session. He called on other nuclear-weapon-free zones to work together to ensure that the second session was held, with the assistance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

25. **Ms. Aitimova** (Kazakhstan) said that Kazakhstan had been strongly committed to the process of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since the early days of its independence. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons, the closure of its nuclear test site and its commitment to its international

obligations reaffirmed its will to strengthen global cooperation on the issue. The CTBT should enter into force as soon as possible and its verification regime should be strengthened, a process to which Kazakhstan had contributed by making available the Semipalatinsk former nuclear test site for the 2008 integrated on-site inspection field exercise. All nuclear activity in Kazakhstan was being carried out in accordance with IAEA standards and under its control. States parties that had not yet done so should meet the conditions for transparency in accordance with safeguards agreements with IAEA, including the signing of Additional Protocols.

26. The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important way to ensure the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime. In response to the Secretary-General's call to address any outstanding issues to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the five Central Asian States had submitted a working paper in accordance with article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.12).

27. The nuclear disarmament process had stagnated in recent years due to a lack of consensus and political will, however, recent developments provided a source of encouragement. Kazakhstan welcomed the pledges by the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and the statement by the President of the United States that he would seek a world without nuclear weapons and pursue the ratification of the CTBT. Though the NPT remained the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the Treaty had failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the appearance of new de facto nuclear States, partly due to a lack of progress in implementing the obligations to reduce existing nuclear arsenals.

28. Non-proliferation and disarmament were complementary processes. IAEA verification regimes should be strengthened, and States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. There should be a new, legally binding treaty on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the negotiations for a non-discriminatory, universally applicable fissile material cut-off treaty should be completed as soon as possible, and an international agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be drafted.

29. Recognizing the right of any nation to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, under strict international control, she stressed that a peaceful, diplomatic resolution should be sought to the recent disputes over nuclear programmes. All States possessing enrichment technologies should work towards internationalizing the services of nuclear technology centres, under the auspices of IAEA.

30. **Mr. Gumbi** (South Africa) said that it was the duty of all States parties to build on the three interlinked provisions of the Treaty in a balanced manner. It was the primary obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to realize nuclear disarmament, and recent statements provided some hope in that regard. Progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT and the resumption of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would provide much-needed confidence. While it was the legitimate right of all States to utilize the atom for peaceful purposes, that right should be exercised with adequate assurances for the international community that there would be no diversion for military purposes.

31. It was incumbent upon all States parties to commit to providing IAEA with the necessary support to fulfil its mandate. Nuclear safety and security remained important, and it was critical that existing IAEA conventions and guidelines should be fully implemented. Increasing the resources of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund could assist in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and the targets of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The existence of an illicit nuclear network presented a serious challenge to the NPT, and decisive action was needed to counter it, including the prosecution of those involved.

32. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an indispensable part of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and efforts should be made to establish such zones in regions where they did not yet exist. In that connection, South Africa welcomed the possibility of the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. The NPT remained the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. South Africa would continue to promote its universal implementation. The consensus decisions of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference would provide a sound basis for a successful 2010 Review Conference.

33. **Mr. Ali** (Malaysia) said that he supported the complete and general disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, accomplished under effective international controls. The multilateral treaties relating to such weapons should be universal, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The current session of the Preparatory Committee was the important final leg in the journey towards a reinvigoration of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda which would culminate in the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The provisional agenda for the 2010 Conference should be agreed immediately.

34. The political will to eliminate the nuclear threat had been absent in recent times. However, the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons was not a utopian dream and achieving it was not a quixotic quest, it had simply been derailed by the focus of some countries in the West on non-proliferation. Malaysia welcomed the recent pronouncement by the President of the United States in Prague, reasserting his commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. That long-overdue call resonated with increasing demands by civil society and former statesmen and policymakers in the West that nuclear-weapon States should exercise leadership and take tangible steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. However, the NPT was under great strain. Developing countries that had renounced nuclear weapons were expected to accept the privilege of the few to maintain their nuclear arsenals and extend their protection to their close allies. Preferential treatment to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was being given to States that were not party to the NPT, which ran counter to article IV of the Treaty. The failure of many in the West to put pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty was preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

36. Regardless of those discouraging developments, the NPT continued to hold, largely due to the unwavering commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to their treaty obligations. States parties should reaffirm and strengthen the grand bargain of the Treaty. Malaysia had submitted a draft resolution to the Disarmament and International Security Committee every year since 1997, reminding Member States of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice reaffirming that nuclear-weapon States were obligated under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

37. To that end, all States should immediately begin multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. Efforts towards disarmament would bolster efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Malaysia strongly disagreed with the doctrine that nuclear-weapon States should maintain nuclear weapons as a deterrent. In their bid to achieve security at all costs, their actions had heightened the sense of insecurity among non-nuclear-weapon States, spurring them to seek their own deterrents, including through the development of nuclear weapons.

38. The change in United States policy was cause for hope, but actions spoke louder than words. Malaysia looked forward to seeing an agreement concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation on a successor to the START I Treaty. United States ratification of the CTBT would spur other Annex 2 countries to accede to it. States parties to the NPT must cooperate to resolve outstanding issues and work to restore the balance of the Treaty. The norms and principles laid down in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I), the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the agreements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference should serve as a basis for that undertaking.

39. In 2008, Malaysia had joined a cross-regional initiative with Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, the De-Alerting Group. The Group believed that the maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons at high levels of readiness posed a grave danger to all. Taking nuclear weapons off alert was a practical step that could be taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of nuclear war and would not diminish their security

capabilities in any way. De-alerting would complement quantitative disarmament measures.

40. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom) said that his country's Prime Minister had described nuclear weapons as one of the big issues of the contemporary world, even though it had perhaps had less exposure than the issues of climate change, the global financial crisis, global poverty and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, or the security threats posed by regional conflicts and terrorism. However, not only was the nuclear question as pressing as those other issues, they were intrinsically linked and required the same concerted international response.

41. The NPT provided a set of principles and a framework that had served well for the past 40 years. The task ahead was to renew the grand bargain at its heart and reinvigorate the commitment of the international community to stopping proliferation, realizing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and delivering the ultimate goal: a world free from nuclear weapons. A global coalition should be built around that shared vision. The world needed to move from a decade of deadlock to a decade of decision.

42. The United Kingdom had set out its vision for a reinvigorated non-proliferation regime and a world without nuclear weapons at the beginning of the review cycle in 2007. Two years on, the Prime Minister had committed to a renewed push. The United Kingdom welcomed the commitment, energy and leadership brought to the issue by the President of the United States and the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude a legally binding successor to the START I Treaty. However, success at the 2010 Review Conference was the shared responsibility of all States. All States needed to comply with their international nuclear non-proliferation obligations, especially in cases where they had been reinforced by Security Council resolutions. The United Kingdom was ready to play its full part, including through the publication of a "Road to 2010" plan later that year, intended to identify areas around which consensus could be built to strengthen the NPT and the broader disarmament architecture at the 2010 Review Conference.

43. **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the world was facing a number of challenges caused by the double standards and unjust policies of certain States. Those States portrayed themselves as the guarantors of peace and security, yet their illegal actions were weakening international institutions. Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to be unbalanced. The United States of America, the United Kingdom and France possessed thousands of nuclear weapons and continued to develop and transfer them, including to non-nuclear-weapon States. There was a growing tendency to threaten the use of such weapons for political purposes, and a real risk that they might be deployed. Non-nuclear-weapon States might legitimately ask what they had achieved by acceding to the Treaty.

44. The non-nuclear-weapon States had nevertheless agreed in 1995 to extend the Treaty indefinitely, in the hope that it could be rescued at the 2000 Review Conference. However, in a frustrating setback, a certain number of nuclear-weapon States had subsequently reneged on their unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament. Recent efforts to turn the Treaty into a single-goal treaty appeared to be aimed at securing a monopoly on nuclear energy for nuclear-weapon States.

45. The United States, the United Kingdom and France continued to cooperate on nuclear programmes with the Zionist regime, in blatant violation of the Treaty and of the commitments undertaken in 1995 and in 2000. The Zionist regime had rejected international calls to accede to the Treaty, thereby preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Its nuclear weapons threatened international peace and security, with potentially catastrophic results.

46. Article IV of the Treaty provided for the transfer of peaceful technologies to States parties. However, certain States persisted in imposing illegal and unilateral restrictions on States parties to the Treaty, thereby depriving the latter of their legitimate and inalienable right to nuclear development. The 2010 Conference should address that practice, as well as the instrumental use of international organizations. IAEA should verify compliance with article IV, and violators ought to pay compensation.

47. Certain nuclear-weapon States had contributed to the emergence of new nuclear-weapon possessors and given momentum to the arms race. The Review Conference could not overlook the fact that those States had transferred weapons-grade materials to non-parties. Yet the decision recently taken by the

Nuclear Suppliers Group, under pressure from the United States, gave the signal that there was more to be gained from remaining outside the Treaty.

48. The United States authorities had recently undertaken to change course and move towards nuclear disarmament. The experience of the previous forty years showed that such promises had never materialized. It was therefore essential that they should be backed by verifiable and irreversible action. The United States should abandon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, honour its commitments under the Review Conferences and end its nuclear cooperation with the Zionist regime, urging the latter to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and accede to the Treaty.

49. Statements such as that of the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union had referred to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was in fact exclusively peaceful. Such references were selective and detrimental to a cooperative working environment. It was also discouraging that the Secretary-General had referred to a State party and to a non-party on an equal standing.

50. **Mr. Valero** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that multilateral negotiations towards disarmament had reached a stalemate. There was a risk that nuclear weapons could be acquired by terrorist groups, or indeed deployed by nuclear-weapons-States against States parties. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty, the nuclear powers should exercise greater responsibility in working to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Negotiations towards achieving horizontal and vertical proliferation should take place in a spirit of good faith. It was regrettable some States were held to their obligations under international agreements whereas others were exempted. Such discriminatory practices ran counter to the principle of the equality of States.

51. The nuclear-weapon States had made substantial commitments at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. A transparent and universal verification system was therefore necessary. The Conference on Disarmament should work to identify the necessary steps to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. It was also important to arrive at a consensus in order to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to give it a mandate. Another vital issue was the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for the development of nuclear weapons.

52. It was unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon-States continued to consider nuclear weapons as a deterrent against other States parties, while the latter were in compliance with their obligations. Non-nuclear-weapon States must receive negative security guarantees through a binding international instrument. His country also hoped that further nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established, in particular in the Middle East and in central Europe. Lastly, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, parties had an inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. His country rejected any politicized attempts to undermine the provisions of the Treaty through actions aimed at impairing its integrity.

53. **Mr. Snoussi** (Tunisia) said that States parties must find a balance between their respective obligations and responsibilities under the provisions of the NPT. In that connection, he welcomed the decision taken by the United States and the Russian Federation to intensify negotiations on reducing their strategic nuclear weapon arsenals, as well as the commitment made by the new administration of the United States to advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

54. Regrettably, there had been no meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament. He called on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the unequivocal commitments that they had made at the 2000 Review Conference to begin eliminating their arsenals and hoped that they would honour their promise by speeding up negotiations on the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000. In the meantime, effective safeguards had to be put in place against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that had voluntarily renounced the possession of nuclear weapons.

55. The failure of some nuclear-weapon States to ratify the CTBT, especially those whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, was cause for concern. Moreover, the development of new types of nuclear weapons was contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the adoption of the CTBT. One objective still to be achieved was the drafting of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Negotiations had not even begun on such an

instrument, even though it was crucial for the speedy and effective elimination of nuclear weapons.

56. It was crucial to uphold the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The development of civilian nuclear programmes by States should be respected and encouraged; at the same time, IAEA played an essential role in ensuring that States fulfilled their commitments to safety, security and non-proliferation.

57. The effectiveness and credibility of the NPT depended on its universality. It was especially urgent for States with a nuclear capability to accede to it, as that would reinforce security in regions of tension like the Middle East. It was regrettable that, despite the desire shown by the States of the Middle East to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel alone continued to refuse to sign the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Such behaviour constituted an obstacle to disarmament efforts in general and to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East.

58. **Mr. Argüello** (Argentina) said that his country's position as a producer and user of nuclear energy gave it a particular responsibility to promote nuclear disarmament. At the bilateral level, Argentina and Brazil had in 2008 reaffirmed their nuclear cooperation agreements, which covered such areas as uranium enrichment and the construction of power reactors. Such agreements sprang from a will to satisfy the region's energy needs while ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology. At the regional level, Argentina was party to such agreements as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

59. States parties should honour their commitment to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, instead of seeking to reinterpret that commitment. Nuclear powers should show leadership, notably by moving towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, promoting the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and calling for the Disarmament Conference to begin negotiations without preconditions towards a treaty on fissile materials. He welcomed the recent statement made by the two largest nuclear-weapon States, and trusted that it would lead to tangible action.

60. As a State possessing the technology necessary for the full nuclear fuel cycle, Argentina stressed the need to take a balanced approach to such advanced technology. Any attempt to redefine the delicate balance of obligations contained in the Treaty, to question the value of those obligations, or indeed to cast doubt on the right of States to peaceful nuclear development, risked undermining the non-proliferation system in place. His country would spare no effort to preserve the integrity and legitimacy of the Treaty. Several delegations had expressed cautious optimism about the current Preparatory Committee, and it was important to capitalize on that renewed political will.

61. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia), reporting on the first meeting of Mongolia and the focal points of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, held in Mongolia in April 2009, said that participants had discussed implementation of the Tlatelolco Declaration as well as preparations for the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Participants had stressed the importance of the universalization of the NPT and of the speedy entry into force of the CTBT. They had been briefed on developments regarding the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol. Participants had also expressed support for the Secretary-General's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament; welcomed the entry into force of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the imminent entry into force of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone; and considered the possibility of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare an updated comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.

62. Representatives from Mongolia, the Russian Federation and China had met in March 2009 to discuss a draft trilateral treaty prepared by Mongolia to address the external aspects of its status. The draft was similar to other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties but took into account Mongolia's location and its relations with its two neighbours. The three parties had agreed to continue talks.

63. **Mr. Al-Hamadi** (Qatar) said that progress was still slow with regard to nuclear disarmament, owing to the refusal of five nuclear-weapon States to reduce and stop the development of their nuclear arsenals and the failure of other nuclear-weapon States to accede to the NPT. The final disposal of all nuclear weapons must remain the ultimate objective of States parties to the NPT. Until then, a binding international instrument

must be reached in order to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. It was also important to stress the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

64. Qatar supported early implementation of the CTBT and rapid action on General Assembly resolution 50/66 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The States parties to the NPT, particularly those that had supported that resolution, must break their silence regarding Israel's nuclear policy, which violated the NPT, brought the region into an arms race and endangered regional and international security. The accession of Israel to the NPT would boost confidence in seeking solutions to the problems of the Middle East. The Arab countries would be seeking alternatives with regard to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone depending on the outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

65. It was regrettable that no progress had been made at the 2009 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission regarding the goal of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, because of double standards and discriminatory policies. Qatar had taken a number of steps to strengthen the NPT at the international and national levels, including by participating in conferences and submitting reports to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; signing a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and a small quantities protocol with IAEA; providing training to technical experts and professionals in the implementation of international instruments on the prohibition of weapons of all kinds; and enacting the necessary national legislation to comply with his country's obligations in the areas of disarmament and international security.

66. **Mr. Onemola** (Nigeria) said that States parties must adopt a spirit of compromise if they were to achieve consensus on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the recent statements made by the Russian Federation and the United States, which had effectively renewed their commitments to reducing their nuclear armaments, and called on other nuclear-weapon States to do the same. He urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty and called on States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT and to ratify the CTBT.

67. **Mr. Balé** (Congo) said that only the full implementation of the legal obligations of States parties to the NPT to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to launch negotiations on effective measures to cease the nuclear arms race could ensure international peace and security. Universal ratification of the NPT and implementation of the recommendations adopted by the States parties to the NPT at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, particularly the 13 practical steps, were of crucial importance.

68. He welcomed the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and the efforts of the African Union towards establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. He furthermore supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

69. Limiting negotiations to States parties to the NPT diminished the effectiveness of the Treaty. It was therefore crucial to pursue the objective of universal adherence. Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and other explosive substances for military purposes were urgently necessary. It was also important to strengthen the role of IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties.

70. Lastly, States' compliance with their obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) must be enforced in order to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Cooperation between States on that issue must take place within the framework of the United Nations, in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

71. **Mr. Owade** (Kenya) said that nuclear disarmament must remain the ultimate goal, given emerging threats, including terrorism. Nuclear-weapon States therefore needed to hasten their reduction of nuclear arsenals. In that regard, he welcomed the decision by the United States and the Russian Federation to launch a new round of negotiations on nuclear arms reduction and called on other major nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar strategic negotiations in order to enhance nuclear safety and security. The question of the entry into force of the CTBT should be addressed as a matter of priority. In that connection, he welcomed the recent overtures by Washington to ratify that Treaty and appealed to all

States, particularly those whose ratification was needed for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so as quickly as possible.

72. IAEA played a pivotal role in verifying compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties concluded under the NPT. Attempts to play political games with IAEA would only weaken it and render it incapable of discharging its crucial responsibilities in promoting nuclear safety. It was important to recognize the inalienable right of States parties to the NPT to determine and meet their nuclear energy needs. IAEA could be an important partner in ensuring a non-discriminatory approach to nuclear fuel supply and an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between suppliers and consumers.

73. **Mr. Danon** (France) expressed the hope that the 2010 NPT Review Conference would see the adoption of concrete, realistic action plans, based on the Treaty's three pillars. France had taken a number of steps to contribute to nuclear disarmament since its accession to the Treaty, including, most recently, the proposal of tangible initiatives for disarmament to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session.

74. With regard to proliferation, the international community must respond firmly to the major challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was necessary to promote universal implementation of IAEA safeguards agreements as well as the conclusion of additional protocols; together, those instruments would allow IAEA to best fulfil its mission. It was also important to advocate for more rigorous export controls, especially within the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in order to prevent the transfer of nuclear materials. Operational decisions must be taken with regard to the consequences of withdrawals from the Treaty.

75. The international community must use every possible means to prevent risks, particularly those related to terrorism, that were linked to the availability and circulation of nuclear goods, including through clandestine networks. France was willing to share its experience with civilian nuclear energy with any country seeking to acquire a nuclear power capacity and in compliance with their international non-proliferation obligations. In recent years, his country had forged an increasing number of partnerships, particularly with developing countries, in order to achieve that objective.

76. He stressed the urgent nature of engaging in a dialogue with India, Israel and Pakistan, with a view to ensuring their compliance with international standards on non-proliferation and export controls. The establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East was of the utmost importance. A solution to the Iranian question would contribute to international non-proliferation efforts and to the realization of such a zone. Ratification of the CTBT by all Middle Eastern States and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty would also constitute significant steps in that direction.

77. **Mr. Duncan** (United Kingdom), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said it was regrettable that some delegations had not heeded the words of the Secretary-General with regard to the need to alleviate international concerns. He would address the allegations made about British commitment to nuclear disarmament during the appropriate cluster debate. He drew attention to a recent speech made by the British Prime Minister who, while recognizing the serious challenges currently facing the world, had urged the international community to unite around a common purpose and form a new multilateralism that rejected confrontation and was based on a commitment to the power of international cooperation.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 June 2009

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Third session
New York, 4-15 May 2009

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday 5 May 2009, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:	Mr. Chidyausiku	(Zimbabwe)
later:	Mr. Tarui (Vice-Chairman)	(Japan)
later:	Mr. Chidyausiku	(Zimbabwe)

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

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Hernández** (El Salvador) said that, given the dangers inherent in the use of nuclear weapons, El Salvador wondered about the potential response by an affected State or the international community to their use by non-State actors and what responsibilities their home Governments or authorities might bear. It also wondered about guarantees that even limited use of nuclear weapons by States would not lead to a broader or disproportionate response that would heighten the nuclear threat. Because those questions remained unanswered, States must examine such hypothetical situations, and adopt measures to prevent non-State actors and States from obtaining and using nuclear weapons and strengthen the legal regime for disarmament and non-proliferation by fully respecting and reinforcing existing international instruments through more accessions and ratifications and the negotiation of new agreements.

2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be revitalized. Nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must comply fully with their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI and implement the thirteen practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, including joining the control and verification regimes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. El Salvador commended IAEA for its work to prevent diversion of fissile material or nuclear technology for non-peaceful use.

3. El Salvador believed that the conditions existed to start negotiations for a legally binding treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The international community must agree to a total moratorium on tests and ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The ratification of that Treaty by Colombia and the commitment of the new United States administration to do so were welcome.

4. While multilateralism was important in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, bilateral efforts should also be encouraged. Her delegation welcomed the commitments by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to hold talks that would lead towards the replacement of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (START I).

5. Sustainable, transparent and stable relations based on trust, not deterrence, were the way towards international peace and security and El Salvador had rejected nuclear deterrence as a strategic military doctrine. A universal and legally binding instrument under which nuclear-weapon States would unconditionally guarantee not to threaten to use or use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was a matter of urgency. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, El Salvador reiterated its full support for all bilateral and multilateral endeavours that promoted disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Confidence-building measures and the strengthening of international law played an important role in guaranteeing international peace, stability and security.

6. **Mr. Yelchenko** (Ukraine) said his country had demonstrated its commitment to a strong nuclear non-proliferation regime by renouncing its nuclear capability and acceding to the Treaty in 1994. Ukraine thus called on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its decision to withdraw from the six-party talks, cease IAEA cooperation and restore its nuclear facilities. It also called on States that were not yet party to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

7. Disarmament through reductions in weapons and stockpiles must be irreversible, transparent and verifiable. Ukraine called on States, especially Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify CTBT and respect a moratorium on nuclear testing. It welcomed the accession by Timor-Leste and ratification by Lebanon and noted with satisfaction the importance given by the new United States administration to CTBT.

8. Ukraine reaffirmed its support for IAEA and commended its safeguards work. It supported the universalization of safeguards agreements and additional protocols as the verification standard, for the Treaty. While the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament was regrettable, the approach proposed in the Presidents' non-paper could advance the Conference's work, especially a fissile material cut-off treaty. An international legally binding instrument on credible negative security assurances would enhance the non-proliferation regime; his delegation encouraged nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their

positions. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the one recently established in Central Asia, should continue to be promoted. Further, the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference remained valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved. Ukraine attached great importance to implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and proposed that a reference to the resolution could be inserted in the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

9. The 2010 Review Conference should allow progress on such issues as greater transparency and verifiable mechanisms for reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances to draft a universal, non-conditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; international cooperation to promote multilateralism in the fuel cycle and supply; consideration of additional measures to further strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism; additional measures to bring CTBT into force; a response to withdrawal from the Treaty; and improvement of the NPT review process.

10. **Mr. Natalegawa** (Indonesia) said that, while some nuclear-weapon States had continued to rely on nuclear weapons in their military doctrine over the past decade, civil society, Government leaders and academia had intensified the campaign for their elimination. Indonesia welcomed recent statements by nuclear-weapon States regarding disarmament, reiterating that progress required a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. The United States of America and the Russian Federation in particular, must lead by example, and he welcomed their joint statement on the replacement for START I and the United States commitment to ratify CTBT.

11. With an apparent consensus arising at the Conference on Disarmament, Indonesia felt that negotiations for a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty could begin based on the Shannon report and its mandate. Complete disarmament would need benchmarks, timetables and specific steps agreed to by all States parties. Momentum towards a nuclear-weapon-free world opened the way politically to a nuclear weapon convention.

12. The very existence of nuclear arsenals constituted possible use; therefore proposals by non-nuclear-weapon States for universal, non-conditional and legally binding security assurances must be a priority. Nuclear weapons must be outlawed in order to prevent States from obtaining them and to push nuclear-weapon States to expedite their disarmament commitments and obligations. The transparency of full implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol could strengthen the non-proliferation regime and facilitate cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. While Indonesia welcomed the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, it was dissatisfied with slow progress towards such a zone in the Middle East. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, he urged the parties concerned to resume dialogue within the context of the six-party talks. As for Iran, his delegation was encouraged by the new United States approach and the readiness of concerned parties to hold talks and negotiate without preconditions, on the basis of mutual interest and respect.

14. Indonesia called on States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. However, nuclear cooperation between States parties and non-parties, could effectively encourage non-participation, which was regrettable.

15. **Ms. Gottemoeller** (United States of America) said that her Government believed that the Treaty's framework was sound but that it must be strengthened to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Verification and compliance must be improved and responsible use of nuclear energy by all States fostered. Cooperation and shared understanding would enable States to strengthen the pillars of the Treaty and restore confidence in its credibility and effectiveness.

16. The United States of America would seek balance in the emphasis on the three pillars of the Treaty in the review process. Regarding the disarmament pillar, the United States and Russia would replace START I with a legally binding agreement that would usher in further cuts in nuclear weapons. President Obama and Russian Federation President Medvedev had stated that cuts would be deeper than in existing arms control agreements and that the replacement for START should

include verification measures based on experience with its implementation. In addition to ratification of CTBT, her Government would launch a diplomatic effort with the other States whose ratifications were needed for the CTBT to enter into force. It would seek a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, by limiting fissile material worldwide, could help to secure such material against theft or seizure by terrorists. The negotiation of a verifiable treaty was her country's top priority at the Conference on Disarmament and, despite the long-standing failure to achieve consensus, the United States hoped that its renewed flexibility would enable negotiations to commence. She reaffirmed her Government's unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and called on all other Governments, especially the other nuclear-weapon States, publicly to declare or reaffirm their intention to join that moratorium, along with the moratorium on nuclear explosive tests.

17. In order to build confidence that further reductions in nuclear weapons could be made without undermining international peace and security, it was critical for parties to comply fully with their obligations. To that end, greater resources and authority were required to strengthen international inspections, and much of that increase should go to IAEA, whose systems of safeguards was vital in verifying compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Efforts must be redoubled to update IAEA safeguards technologies and convince parties that had not yet done so to bring into force the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty. The universal entry into force of the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements must also be pursued vigorously. Universal NPT adherence, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remained a fundamental objective of the United States, and consequences for those breaking the rules or withdrawing from the Treaty without cause must be addressed. The United States hoped that parties to the Treaty would propose ways to develop such consequences.

18. As States pursued additional, complementary measures, the basis of the Treaty would be strengthened. A campaign to ensure that all nuclear materials were secured or eliminated and that commerce in nuclear material and technology supported solely peaceful uses was necessary to prevent proliferation to States and to terrorists, the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.

19. Her Government fully recognized and supported the pillar of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States, but it must be based on compliance with rules, including non-proliferation obligations. The United States had led global cooperation in nuclear energy to benefit mankind and would continue to contribute substantial resources in that area for peaceful purposes, through IAEA and bilaterally, in line with the highest safety and non-proliferation standards. The power of nuclear energy must be harnessed to combat climate change. IAEA member States were considering a nuclear fuel bank, to which the United States Government was contributing nearly $50 million, to reassure countries embarking on or expanding nuclear power programmes and complying fully with their non-proliferation obligations that they would not be subject to disruptions in commercial supplies. It could also show that buying expensive enrichment and reprocessing facilities was not necessary to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

20. While it remained concerned that further coordination was needed to strengthen the Treaty, the United States reaffirmed its indefinite extension in 1995, along with other decisions, including the Middle East resolution. Her delegation hoped that procedural arrangements for the Review Conference would be settled quickly so that substantive objectives could be pursued.

21. **Mr. Çorman** (Turkey) said that Turkey advocated global, overall disarmament and supported international efforts to achieve international security through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Turkey was also a party to all international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes and meticulously fulfilled its obligations thereunder. Such instruments should be implemented effectively, strengthened further and universalized.

22. Turkey regarded the Treaty as the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and disarmament and was fully committed to implementing all three pillars thereof. He noted with satisfaction that the approach promoted by Turkey — that of equal and balanced treatment of all three pillars — had gained increased support. The NPT regime, though not perfect or universal, had been instrumental in curbing nuclear

proliferation, inspiring further steps towards disarmament and establishing a fair system of international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was a unique instrument to which no viable alternative was in sight.

23. Turkey also attached great significance to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a possible first step towards overcoming the difficulties surrounding non-proliferation and disarmament. States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty should do so as early as possible, especially if their ratification was required for the Treaty to enter into force. Until then, States should abide by a moratorium on nuclear explosions and avoid action that was contrary to the Treaty's provisions. The initiation of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty, meanwhile, could pave the way for progress on various fronts, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the prevention of an arms race in space.

24. The 2005 Review Conference's inconclusive outcome should not lead to pessimism. Achievements at earlier review conferences were testimonies to the expertise, knowledge and wisdom long associated with the NPT regime. The nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had culminated in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, while the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 had demonstrated the possibility of reaching unanimity, even in tough times. It was important to build upon such accomplishments. A reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the 13 practical steps at the 2010 Review Conference would be particularly welcome.

25. Turkey would continue to work towards universalization of the Treaty, further reductions in nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. Turkey regarded comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocols thereto as the current IAEA verification standard. It also valued highly the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction wherever feasible. Such a zone would be particularly welcome in the Middle East. All parties concerned should seek to reach a common regional understanding on the project.

26. To protect the integrity and credibility of the NPT, all parties must make a renewed commitment to its principles and objectives. It was time to recapture the spirit of 1995 and 2000. Simultaneous progress on the Treaty's three pillars would revalidate its status as the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation and provide a sound basis for the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

27. *Mr. Tarui (Japan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

28. **Ms. Kolontai** (Belarus) recalled that Belarus had been the first country to renounce voluntarily the opportunity to take ownership of the nuclear weapons left in its territory following the fall of the Soviet Union. States parties should remember the significance of nuclear disarmament as a strategic goal of the Treaty and use the forum of the Conference on Disarmament to push forward discussions on a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament matters, negative security assurances and preventing an arms race in outer space. Belarus welcomed the commitment of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, to show leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

29. Providing non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding security assurances would increase confidence and predictability in international relations, strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give the Treaty the requisite universality. The States parties should not neglect the regional aspects of implementation of the Treaty, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which would help to consolidate non-proliferation and encourage nuclear disarmament.

30. The existing instruments and IAEA mechanisms should be exploited to ensure that nuclear technology was used only for peaceful purposes. Belarus was among the many countries to have pursued sustainable economic growth through proposed peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It intended to develop its national nuclear programme in close cooperation with IAEA, believing that such an approach would lay the basis for the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities and proper handling of radioactive sources, spent fuel and nuclear waste.

31. **Ms. Juul** (Norway) said that the 2010 Review Conference would be crucial for the authority of the NPT, which, though the cornerstone of collective

security for almost 40 years, was under increasing strain. Serious proliferation challenges remained, expectations regarding nuclear disarmament were far from being met, little progress had been made in establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and some feared that the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy might be undermined. The broad consensus of 1995 had faded. A decade had been lost in the quest for a nuclear-weapon-free world. If the international community failed in 2010, as it had done in 2005, the NPT risked gradual erosion and possible marginalization. Such a development would undermine the world's common security.

32. That gloomy scenario could, however, be avoided. There were new and hopeful windows of opportunity. She welcomed the recent statement by United States President Obama and Russian Federation President Medvedev on a follow-on to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and recent statements by nuclear-weapon States on their commitment to eliminate fully nuclear arms. It was important to build on that momentum.

33. The 2010 Review Conference should revive a broad-based common understanding on addressing nuclear dangers and ensuring peaceful applications of nuclear technology in a more secure, nuclear-weapon-free world. It should also agree on a programme of work up until 2015 and on steps to be taken thereafter. The Preparatory Committee should lay the foundation for a successful Review Conference. It must resolve all procedural issues and agree on an agenda so that all issues relevant to the proper functioning of the NPT could be discussed at the Review Conference.

34. Even more important than the current session was the run-up to the Review Conference itself. States parties had a responsibility to contribute in a constructive manner. Preparations must be guided by a spirit of compromise. States parties must also fulfil their obligations under the NPT. The three pillars were interlinked; there could be no "NPT à la carte". Full nuclear disarmament would be achieved only when there was full confidence that no one could circumvent the non-proliferation regime. The much-needed steps to tighten up non-proliferation could be taken only if there was an unequivocal and irreversible process towards complete elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. Strengthened non-proliferation must also facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

35. To succeed, it was necessary to adopt innovative approaches, to build bridges and to reach out across regional groupings and overcome past polarizations. The NPT process should not be considered a zero-sum game. The 2010 outcome must be a win-win situation for all. To achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, it was important to mobilize all stakeholders. Civil society must be engaged fully, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia viewed as valuable partners. The erosion of the NPT was a risk, but by no means a certainty. She urged States parties to seize the current opportunity to consolidate and to strengthen further the Treaty.

36. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) welcomed the renewed momentum of recent days, particularly the commitment made by key States to work towards nuclear disarmament. The only way to universalize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments was through multilateralism. He hoped that the current session would have a practical impact. His delegation would provide its full support and cooperation in that regard.

37. The NPT remained the most important instrument for attaining nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, and the CTBT was an important step forward in that regard. He reaffirmed the need for the universality of the NPT, CTBT and all major international disarmament instruments without exception. The lack of political will among some Member States had been impeding progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Statements by nuclear-weapon States and efforts by the international community must be matched by concrete action.

38. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate right to unconditional security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. He called for the early negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

39. Bangladesh had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear disarmament by remaining non-nuclear, by becoming a party to almost all the disarmament-related treaties and by remaining under IAEA safeguards measures. It also supported regional approaches to nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the establishment

of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The establishment of such zones was an important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. It also contributed to regional confidence-building measures and reduced the threat to non-nuclear-weapon States.

40. Recalling that the NPT guaranteed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and that some developing country non-nuclear-weapon States parties had benefited from cooperation with developed countries in that regard, he said that compliant States in dire need of such energy must be given technical and financial assistance. Global expenditure on armament had reached $1.4 trillion in 2007, a 45 per cent increase since 1998. Some States were clearly spending excessive amounts on armament. Such expenditure should be reduced to free up resources for pressing development challenges.

41. The run-up to the 2010 Review Conference provided an opportunity for all parties to take stock of the progress made thus far. He urged all States parties to remain fully committed to their obligations under both the NPT and the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000. Member States must adopt practical measures to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Review Conference outcome should therefore address disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and contain specific mechanisms for implementation and follow-up.

42. Lastly, he welcomed the positive developments of recent days. It was important to seize the momentum. He hoped that Member States would demonstrate flexibility and understanding so that the 2010 Review Conference adopted a consensus-based outcome that paved the way for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

43. **Mr. Hoang Chi Trung** (Viet Nam) welcomed the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and the recent statement by President Obama signalling the United States' intention to lead efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. As the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the NPT must be strengthened in all its aspects. To that end, the Preparatory Committee should review achievements and shortcomings, and identify practical and appropriate ways of ensuring the full and non-selective implementation of the Treaty.

44. The only absolute guarantee against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons was their elimination. Thousands of nuclear weapons were stockpiled and deployed around the world, many of them on hair-trigger alert. To avoid nuclear disaster, solutions leading to the elimination of such weapons must be found. Until such time, nuclear-weapon States should undertake the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000. In that connection, the Review Conference should support the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and urge nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons and to offer non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. A subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament should also be established within Main Committee I.

45. Lastly, expressing support for the CTBT and its early entry into force, he welcomed the recent establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. Such zones strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regimes in the regions concerned and enhanced regional and global peace and security.

46. **Mr. Al-Bayati** (Iraq) said that forty years on, the NPT was not yet being implemented in a balanced manner, as shown by the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their nuclear disarmament obligations, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and the decision adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference reaffirming the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States continued to flout their commitments, opting instead to develop new generations of nuclear weapons and maintain the role of such weapons in their military and security policies. States Parties to the Treaty must achieve a balance between mutual commitments and responsibilities incumbent upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, putting an end to the nuclear double standard was essential to the success of non-proliferation efforts. Priority must be placed on efforts to conclude an unconditional, legally binding universal instrument governing security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. The existing imbalances in the treaty and the shortcomings in some of its provisions might have grave repercussions, were such defects to go unaddressed.

47. His delegation hoped that the 2010 Review Conference would bolster the three pillars of the Treaty, and urged States to negotiate and conclude a multilateral, non-discriminatory fissile material cut-off treaty. Iraq also welcomed the initiative taken by the United States of America to reduce existing strategic arsenals and to move towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty. It called on all countries to implement the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, so as to boost the credibility of the NPT and the review process itself.

48. The objective of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 had been to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a question integral to its central purpose. Therefore, failure to deliver on the outcome of the Review and Extension Conference would have a negative impact on the very future of the NPT. The 2010 Review Conference would mark a critical juncture, at which the international community would be faced with two options: either to allow the NPT regime to collapse or to use the opportunities afforded by the Conference to make progress towards achieving the objectives of the Treaty and address the challenges that arose as a result of the failure to comply fully with its provisions. He hoped that States Parties would be able to craft constructive proposals at the current Preparatory Conference in particular to provide legally binding, unconditional assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

49. **Mr. Loulichki** (Morocco) welcomed the recent move towards collective and multilateral action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as demonstrated by President Obama's comments in Prague and the stand taken by France and the dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation. To maximize the chances of success in 2010, the procedural pitfalls that had caused the 2005 Review Conference to fail must be avoided. To that end, the Committee must resolve all organizational and procedural issues and transmit substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

50. The role of the NPT as a key instrument for international peace and security must be strengthened. After more than 40 years in existence, it had demonstrated its relevance and importance. Even though the world had changed, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy remained the three pillars of international action.

51. The international community must make nuclear disarmament a priority. The renewed commitment of certain nuclear powers was welcome; they must reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategies and set specific deadlines for reducing their nuclear arsenals. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties must also fulfil their obligations under the NPT. Efforts by such States to acquire nuclear weapons constituted a violation of the NPT and must not be ignored. The right to benefit from international cooperation on nuclear energy for civilian purposes must be protected. Civil nuclear energy was an instrument for scientific and technological progress and must not be denied to countries that legitimately aspired to economic and social development.

52. His delegation endorsed the proposal to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament within Main Committee I, stressed the importance of beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and called for the early entry into force of the CTBT.

53. Morocco attached great importance to the universality of the NPT. In that regard, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East must be respected and the progress made on its implementation evaluated. Israel must accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

54. The risk of nuclear terrorism was a major challenge for international security. Cooperation must be stepped up and awareness of those dangers and their implications for security and for the environment raised. Morocco had joined and had hosted the inaugural meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In June 2009, it would host an international seminar on preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials in preparation for the annual meeting of the Global Initiative to be held in The Hague later that month.

55. **Mr. Pálsson** (Iceland) said that the NPT remained the bedrock of global security. The many challenges it had faced in recent years should harden the international community's resolve to strengthen its universality, effectiveness and authority. Noting that questions continued to arise over individual countries' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, he urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, to rejoin the

six-party talks and to resume cooperation with IAEA, and encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with IAEA and to abide by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

56. To maximize the chances of a successful Review Conference in 2010, States parties must rigorously pursue the three pillars of the NPT, without creating unhelpful or unnecessary linkages between them. The recent encouraging signs in the political arena pointed to a new era of arms control and disarmament. States parties must seize the opportunity to agree on an agenda for, and concrete recommendations to, the Review Conference.

57. The elimination of nuclear weapons had become a realistic goal. While nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, transparent and verifiable nuclear disarmament must be accelerated. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to take bolder steps in that regard and welcomed the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and the latest nuclear disarmament measures introduced by France and the United Kingdom.

58. A verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty was vital to the lasting success of the NPT regime, as was the entry into force of the CTBT. He welcomed signatory States' renewed commitments in that regard and urged all States, particularly the remaining Annex 2 States, to ratify the CTBT at the earliest opportunity.

59. While it was the sovereign right of any country to decide its own mix of energy supply, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology must be reconciled with the goal of non-proliferation, particularly now that States were increasingly exploring nuclear power. The indispensable role of IAEA in promoting safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies must be fully recognized. Its comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols were essential in that regard. Noting that ensuring nuclear safety and the security of people and of their environment was a valid concern, he stressed the importance of adherence to the relevant conventions and guidelines. Lastly, tighter controls of the fuel cycle and the peaceful use of nuclear technology should be regarded as compatible goals. The adoption of a multilateral approach to the fuel cycle should be discussed further to prevent sensitive nuclear technologies from falling into the wrong hands.

60. **Mr. Migliore** (Holy See) said that unfortunately, 40 years after the NPT had entered into force, over 26,000 nuclear warheads remained in the world and some nations were still engaged in nuclear arms races, despite legally binding obligations with regard to non-proliferation and disarmament.

61. Nevertheless, his delegation was heartened by recent initiatives taken by Governments, international organizations and civil society to address nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular national policies and bilateral agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals. There was also a need for concrete, transparent and convincing steps in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation according to the principles set forth in the Treaty.

62. In order to build on the new momentum and to promote trust, transparency and cooperation among nations, five objectives could be reached in a short period of time, namely, the entry into force of the CTBT; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; the interpretation by nuclear-weapon States of their military doctrines as precluding reliance on nuclear weapons; full regulation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by IAEA, whose safeguards system must be further enhanced; and the establishment of international structures for the production of nuclear fuel for the benefit of all countries.

63. The existence of nuclear-weapon-free zones attested to the fact that peace and security were possible without possessing nuclear weapons. In order to establish a proper hierarchy of values and priorities, greater common efforts were needed to mobilize resources to benefit ethical, cultural and economic development, so that humanity might turn its back on the arms race.

64. **Mr. Launer** (Austria) said that his delegation welcomed the recent commitment made by the United States of America and the Russian Federation to negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of that year and to include all nuclear-weapon States in that endeavour in due course. Verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament, entry into force of the CTBT and agreement on a comprehensive fissile material cut-off treaty were three elements crucial to achieving the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. Austria also endorsed the appeal by the United Nations Secretary-General to consider a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer,

use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as provide for their elimination. The nuclear-weapon States should jointly address that issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

65. The entry into force of the CTBT was long overdue. Along with Costa Rica, Austria had been coordinating the article XIV process on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT since September 2007; in that time, a considerable number of States had ratified the CTBT, bringing the total number to 148. His Government would continue to raise awareness of the CTBT and such scientific applications of its international monitoring system as the tsunami early warning system, in the hope that a better understanding of the benefits of the CTBT would help speed up the ratification process and its entry into force. To that end, Austria had co-sponsored outreach activities in various parts of the world. He hoped that other countries would respond to the initiative taken by the United States of America immediately and aggressively to pursue ratification by its Government of the CTBT, and called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it without further delay.

66. The fact that the international community had not seen the mid-1960's prediction of a world of 15 or more nuclear-weapon States realized attested to the tireless verification efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency. His Government would continue to support all efforts aimed at strengthening and universalizing the IAEA Agreement on Comprehensive Safeguards and its Additional Protocol and supporting the Agency's work amid ever greater challenges.

67. The dangers related to increasing access to nuclear technology could not be ignored for the sake of short-sighted focus on national economic interests, fears of limitation of state sovereignty or loss of control over a key technology sector. In that connection, Austria was actively participating in the renewed debate on the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle. One of the most tangible projects to date was the establishment of a nuclear fuel reserve under IAEA control. Fully endorsed by the Austrian Government and the European Union, that last-resort facility for consumer countries was intended to offer a credible alternative to the development of national enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Nevertheless, fuel reserve mechanisms could only be the first step in a long journey, the ultimate goal of which should be the multilateralization of all new and existing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In order to stimulate further discussions, Austria will circulate at the current Preparatory Conference a working paper updating positions and considerations submitted earlier in the Review Cycle.

68. **Ms. Rubiales de Chamorro** (Nicaragua) said that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had not conducted themselves in a sufficiently transparent manner nor demonstrated the necessary political will to adhere to the Treaty, as indicated by the lack of progress on the 13 practical steps towards implementation of article VI, adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

69. Nicaragua urged the nuclear-weapon States to commit to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, and in the interim, to uphold their negative security guarantees. Although the Treaty had played a crucial role in preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms, some 26,000 remaining nuclear weapons threatened the existence of life on the planet. Furthermore, the threat of nuclear terrorism, nonexistent when the NPT had been adopted, had emerged after the attacks of 11 September 2001. Nuclear-weapon States must therefore strengthen the safeguards around their nuclear and fissile arsenals, lest they fall into the hands of terrorists.

70. Her Government hoped that the 2010 NPT Review Conference would be able to establish a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament within its Main Committee I that would address obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and establish a programme aimed at the gradual elimination of all nuclear arms. Moreover, the Treaty should in no way infringe on the inalienable right of States parties to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful ends, and to cooperate in that area with other States parties, including the nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament must also make progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.

71. As a founding member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Nicaragua welcomed the establishment of a new nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. It also called on all States of the Middle East, including Israel — the only State in the region that had declared possession of nuclear arms — to

create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, so as to reduce regional tensions and promote lasting peace and security. Lastly, her Government called for the signing and ratification without delay or conditions of the CTBT by those nations that had not done so, so that the treaty could enter into force as soon as possible. Nuclear-weapon States had a particular responsibility in that area.

72. *Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe) resumed the Chair.*

73. **Mr. Wenaweser** (Liechtenstein) said that the 2010 Review Conference must restore the balance between the three pillars of the Treaty. Disarmament and non-proliferation must both be moved forward without progress in one being made conditional on progress in the other. The ultimate goal should be to make the Treaty universal by securing the accession of all remaining countries as non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, a clear understanding should be established of the implications of withdrawal from the Treaty. From the standpoint of international law, it was clear that States parties found to be violating their obligations remained responsible for those violations even after effectively withdrawing from the Treaty.

74. The commitment of the parties to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to a new binding agreement by the end of 2009, when the existing START-I agreement would expire, was encouraging. Ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should continue in the interests of improving nuclear safety and security. Pending the conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the States concerned should declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA non-proliferation mechanism should be strengthened by making the conclusion of additional protocols to safeguards agreements the verification standard.

75. Liechtenstein supported the proposal for a global nuclear fuel bank to guarantee supplies while minimizing the risk of proliferation. As demand for energy was likely to increase substantially, particularly in the developing world, proliferation concerns should not undermine the right of states parties to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. In order to ensure that nuclear technology was used responsibly, without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Liechtenstein supported the technical cooperation role of IAEA. It also emphasized that States must implement the mechanisms established by the Security Council in its resolution 1540 (2004) in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

76. **Mr. Hernández** (Costa Rica) said that, while his delegation fully supported the Treaty, it wondered whether irreversible disarmament and non-proliferation could be achieved on the sole basis of five-yearly conferences, with no active mechanisms for implementation and review. It therefore supported the proposal for an annual meeting to consider and take action on all aspects of the Treaty and for the bureau of the Review Conference to be reconstituted as a standing bureau that could convene extraordinary sessions of the general conference of States parties when a situation threatening the integrity or viability of the Treaty arose.

77. As safeguards reinforced mutual confidence, they should not be subject to any condition or limit. The international community should reinforce IAEA and promote the process of verification, despite the reluctance of some States to accept it, using the existing legal framework for the regulation of weapons. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was only a first step towards general and complete disarmament. It should be supplemented by a universal, legally binding, fissile material cut-off treaty.

78. Recalling that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Costa Rica welcomed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and hoped that the same aim would be pursued in the Middle East and elsewhere. Regretting the failure to act fully on General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Costa Rica fully supported the five-point nuclear disarmament plan proposed by the Secretary-General in October 2008.

79. **Mr. Al-Murad** (Kuwait), affirming that the United Nations and its specialized agencies played a pivotal role in addressing the challenges of

disarmament, said that Kuwait had proposed, and donated substantial resources for, the establishment of a bank of low-grade enriched nuclear fuel to be supervised by IAEA. However, the credibility and universality of the Treaty were suffering as a result of selective compliance by some States parties, leading to lack of trust and a threat to the balance of international and regional peace and stability.

80. Recalling the adoption at the 1995 Review Conference of a resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment in that region of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, Kuwait regretted that, 14 years later, the Middle East provided an example of failure of the Treaty to achieve security for the States parties. It called on Israel, the only non-signatory and only country in the region to possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons, to accede immediately to the Treaty, eliminate its nuclear arsenal and subject all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. The international community should also stop sales of the scientific and technological resources that enabled Israel to further strengthen that arsenal, or that aided any other country seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction.

81. While the recent commitment expressed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation was encouraging, and there was a prospect of progress on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty, the States parties, having already established numerous agreements, resolutions and work plans, had shown a lack of political will. Future efforts should focus on non-selective implementation of the Treaty and expansion of the number of States parties; adherence to policy decisions including the outcome of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the final documents of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences; reaffirmation of the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and close collaboration with IAEA to dispel any ambiguities surrounding nuclear programmes through negotiation and constructive dialogue; establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2010 Review Conference under Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, and the convening of an international conference entitled "the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East by 2011".

82. **Mr. Hassan** (Sudan) said that, as a signatory to the NPT and the CTBT, Sudan insisted on full and universal implementation of both treaties. He hoped that scientific research would be deployed in the service of international peace and security and for the benefit of mankind and, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty, ensuring full respect for the inalienable right of States parties to develop technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

83. He echoed the satisfaction expressed by other delegations at the establishment of zones free of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In that connection, his delegation expressed deep concern at the impossibility of implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and hoped that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would not be impeded because of Israel's failure to place its installations under the IAEA safeguards regime. That matter should be given urgent attention at both the current Preparatory Conference and the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

84. Also worthy of note were the recent statements made by nuclear powers pledging to step up efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he expressed regret at the obstacles to achieving consensus on issues of nuclear non-proliferation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the previous month. Indeed, the strength of the Treaty was derived not from the number of signatories or States parties but rather from their commitment to comply with its provisions.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.